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Assuming the desire of a 9-man Election Tribunal Judges is to protect 
their judgment from public knowledge before judgment is delivered. 
They decided to lock up their judgment in a cabinet. They agree that 
any 5 judges can open the cabinet to retrieve the document, but not 
less than 5 can do so. To achieve this, they will need 1265
9 c  
padlocks to secure the cabinet. This is prohibitive and impracticable in 
real life. A secret sharing algorithm will achieve the judges’ desire 
without having to purchase 126 padlocks to secure the cabinet. 
 
A secret sharing scheme is a method of sharing a key S into pieces 
(called shadows) among a set of p participants called the shareholders 
such that any p shareholders forming a quorum can reconstruct the 
value of S but no group of less than p participants can do so. For 
example, the control of nuclear weapons in Russia involves two-out-of-
three participants (Time Magazine 1992). Usually, a person known as 
the Dealer (D) SD chooses the key S. The dealer gives some 
partial information called shares to each participant which must be 
secretly distributed such that no shareholder knows the share that has 
been given to another shareholder. 
 
When there is need to reconstruct the key S some participants’ ≤ p will 
pull together their shares to reconstruct S. This scheme is represented 
below by Shamir’s (p,n) –threshold scheme in m  
(Stinson 1995). 
 
1. D chooses w distinct, non-zero elements of m , denoted by
ix  wi 1 . For wi 1 , D gives the value ix  to 
participant ip . The values ix  are public 
2. Suppose D wants to share a key mS  . D secretly 
chooses (independently at random) p-1 elements of
11 ,,,  pm aa  . 













4. For wi 1 , D gives the share iy to ip . 
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Suppose that participants npp ,,1   want to determine S. They 
know that )( ii xay  , ni 1 , where ][)( xxa m is the 
(secret) polynomial chosen by D. Since a(x) has degree at most p-1, 






p xaxaaxa  , where 
the coefficients ipaa ,,0   are unknown elements of mZ , and a0 = 
S is the key. 
 
For a (p,p)-threshold scheme, where all participants must pull shares 
together before S can be reconstructed. A (p,p)-threshold scheme is 
described below: 
  
1. D secretly chooses (independently at random) p-1 
elements of 11 ,,, pm yyZ  using a chosen polynomial 















 … (1) 
3. For wi 1 , D gives the shares iy  to ip  
 
















           …  (2) 
 
Shamir (1979) identified some properties of a (p, n) threshold scheme 
as follows: 
 
(1) The size of each piece does not exceed the size of the 
original data.  
(2) When p is kept fixed, Di pieces can be dynamically added or 
deleted (e.g., when executives join or leave the company) 
without affecting the other D, pieces. (A piece is deleted only 
when a leaving executive makes it completely inaccessible, 
even to himself.)  
(3) It is easy to change the Di pieces without changing the 
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An example is considered to demonstrate the workability of this 
scheme.  Assuming the word ATTACK is to be effected at a certain 
time. Assuming no single individual has the sole right to effect the 
commencement of an attack until a group comes together. To solve 
this problem, the word attack will have to be compressed with the 
method in (Adewumi & Garba 2008) and then shared as shown in 
Table 1. 
 
From Table 1, the value to be shared among 4 shareholders is 40. In 
this example, 4 shareholders are used for convenience to correspond 
to each shareholder having only one letter (ATTACK can be formed 
from four letters A, C, K and T).  In Table 1, A occurred in positions 1, 
4; C appeared in positions 2, 3; with K and T appeared in positions 5 
and 6 respectively. A polynomial is now choosing for sharing the code 
(40) amongst these members. If our polynomial is of the form
][mod)( 2
2
1 mSaxaxf  , where a1, a2 are coefficients; S is 
the secret code (in this case 40) and p is prime. 
 
If we choose a1, a2 to be 7 and 8 respectively with p as 41, then the 
polynomial will be  
 
                  ]41[mod4087)(
2  xxxf … (3) 
THE METHOD 
The method below is used to demonstrate this proposed improved 
sharing scheme: 
 
1. Compress the document to be shared using the compression 
algorithm developed by (Adewumi & Garba 2008) into a single 
code. 
2. Share that code amongst p participants with each having kth part 
of the code, an alphabet and a percentage representing the 
given alphabet. 
 
3. To reconstruct the original values  
 
i. Call all the p participants to submit their trusted shares, 
percentage and the alphabet they have  
ii. Reconstruct the secret code. 
iii. Reconstruct each alphabet representing the n splits. 
iv. Carry out decompression 
 
To obtain an efficient quadratic polynomial for generating shadow for 
an integer code, a prime p which must be bigger than the shared code 
must be obtained. The coefficients 110  paaa   in the 
polynomial are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution over the 
integers in [0, m), and the values p1, ..., pn are computed modulo m 
 






Binary strings for the 
positions 
Concatenated binary 




binary strings di 
The length (k) of 
each binary string 
Percentage of li in 
respect to the word 
being compressed 
A 1, 4 001, 100 001100 12 3 30 
C 2,3 010,011 010011 17 3 42.5 
K 5 101 101 5 3 12.5 
T 6 110 110 6 3 15 
      40id    
 
With this polynomial in place, we obtain the shares (shadows) up to p3 
using the (p,n) threshold scheme and p4 can be created using a (p,p) 
threshold scheme and these shares can be given out to each 
shareholder. With this in place, the 4 shareholders must come 
together if they need to reconstruct the secret code 40. The 
shareholders  are  each  given  a  letter  from amongst  A,  C, K and T, 
the percentage representing letter share of the key value and the 
corresponding pi of the letter. Specifically, the following are given out 
as shares to each shareholder: a share of the secret code, a single 
letter of the alphabet (in this case either A, C, K or T), a percentage of 
their shared alphabet and the string length (in this case 3). 
 
Using the polynomial in equation (3), the shares (p1, p2 and p3) can be 
generated as follows: 
Using our polynomial ]41[mod4087)( 2  xxxf , we obtain  
 
p1 = 7+8+40     =   14 (mod 41) 
p2 = 28+16+40 =   2 (mod 41) 
















ipp  = 40 –(14+2+4) mod 41 = 40 – (20 mod 
41) = 40-20 = 20 
 
 p4 = 20. 
 
The following shares are handed out: 
 
p1 = 14 
p2 =   2 
p3 =   4 
p4 = 20. 
 
Specifically, each shareholder receives the following shares as shown 
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TABLE 2.  SHARE TABLE 
 
P1 14 A 30 3 
P2 2 C 42.5 3 
P3 4 K 12.5 3 
P4 20 T 15 3 
 
If at any point the members want to reconstruct the message, all they 
need to do is to come together and submit their shares to a trusted 
individual (may be the dealer of the secret code) who will activate the 
reconstruction as follows: 
 
First, he uses their secret shares of 14, 2, 4 and 20 to recover the 
















. We obtain the secret code (S) as 14+2+4+20 
(mod 41) = 40. 
 
We now calculate decimal number equivalent of the concatenated 
binary strings of each letter A, C, K, and T through their percentages 
as follows: A is 1240
100
30
x ,  C is 1740
100
5.42
x ,                           
K  is 540
100
5.12





Without the knowledge of the secret code 40, the positions of A, C, K, 
and T cannot be reconstructed. 
 
Having recover those for each alphabet, we decompress them to 
recover the document using our decompression technique in 




The scheme provides an improved algorithm for sharing secrets. The 
scheme can be implemented to secure most government classified 
documents in public and private places by first compressing the 
document and then share the code among trusted officers within 
government ministry or agency. Reconstruction will happen when the 
participant come together and the dealer reconstruct their shared 
code, decompress it, only then can they unlock the content of the 
documents otherwise it will not be possible for a small number of 
participants to do so.  
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